A Journey to the post-Soviet Space amid the 2nd Russo-Ukrainian war - (1) Russia and Georgia
Note 1: I cannot come up with any traffic-boosting title for my first post, but the original title will never stand out either. It was originally just an assignment I wrote to fulfil the coursework requirement after travelling solo in several post-Soviet states and attending two summer school programmes in 2024. My journey stopped short as I accidentally fractured my right Radius when I was doing Push Press at the HC gym in Tallinn. With a cast on my forearm and the immense pain I had to endure before returning to Hong Kong to receive surgery, I ended up spending my final days in Tallinn inside a small apartment, typing slowly and painfully with a broken arm.
Note 2: It is true that most, if not all, citizens from a newer generation do not want to associate their nation-states with the (post-)Soviet label. It is also true that there is a generation divide over Soviet nostalgia and how their nation-states today should deal with Russia. I hope I have made my point clear that knowing a bit about how Soviet nationality policy works in different former Soviet states could shed some light on the current social-political and even economic divide in these newly independent nation-states. The Soviet Union is gone for good. The temptation to resurrect the Yalta order, where a few strongmen can divide the world into spheres of influence, is detrimental to the survival of every small nation in the post-Soviet Space.
The legacy of Soviet nationality policy on inter-ethnic relations in the former Soviet space - the centre and the periphery
The impact of Soviet nationality policy and the established racial and regional economic hierarchy can very much be felt in daily life within former Soviet countries. While Political leaders and nationalists search for usable pasts to mobilize citizens and justify policy decisions, the interpretation of the past, often filled with contradictions, also shapes the way how members of different national groups under the Russian sphere of influence perceive each other and their places in the world. It has become a source of multi-ethnic conflicts, civil wars, and hot wars. It also sustains a racial and regional political and economic hierarchy between Moscow and other former Soviet Republics. The mixed reactions and nostalgia towards life under the Soviet Union divide the population in the former Soviet space. The consequence of Russification and the sizable Russian-speaking minorities as a result are increasingly securitized for the preservation of national sovereignty. All these dynamics can be best illustrated by the interwoven relationship between Russia and Georgia, which is looming behind the social fabric of everyday life across socio-economic spectrums.
From time to time, Russian President Vladimir Putin is eager to share his historical insights with global and domestic audiences. In 2016, Mr. Putin criticized Lenin for fostering the development of nationalities after destroying the Russian Empire, "the prison house of nationalities". He accused Lenin of planning a time bomb to Russia for the revival of the demand for national self-determination among different national groups. Obsessed with his study of Russia's historical past, Mr Putin's views are nothing new. A Georgian who was in charge of the Soviet nationalities policy, Ioseb Besaionis dze Jughashvili, best known as Stalin, had already diverged from Lenin's more pragmatic position on the nationalities issue even before the latter died in 1924. Lenin and Stalin drew support from non-Russians under the Tsarist rule by advocating for national self-determination during the revolution and the civil war. But it was also Stalin who, at the Tenth Party Congress in 1921, argued that both great power chauvinism and local nationalism were menaces that would threaten the dissolution of the USSR from within (Brandenberger & Zelenov 2014, p. 866-867). In short, Comrade Stalin and Mr Putin share the same assessment on the threat of local nationalism to a political entity that seeks to hold its vast territories and diverse national groups together under Moscow's command and control.
Perhaps there are no former Soviet Republics other than Georgia that can represent the complexity of the Soviet legacy for being both the periphery within the Soviet Union and the imperial centre within its territories. Subordinated under the Tsarist rule and the Soviet Union, Georgian elites gained power, status, and influence at the imperial centre on multiple occasions. Georgians remain divided today on their view of Ioseb Jughashvili --- Georgians' patron in the Soviet Union who grants Georgia all sorts of entitlement and privileges within the Soviet Union and the GSSR. In the birthplace of Stalin, Gori, which is just a two-hour drive from Tbilisi, stands the infamous Stalin Museum. Some locals continue to organize parades each year to commemorate Stalin's birthday and on May 9, the Victory Day of the Soviet Union over Nazi Germany. Residents are still polarised on the removal of Stalin's statue at midnight in 2010. Attempts to rename the Stalin Avenue, the central street of Gori, have failed. Even when you can persuade these locals that Stalin had crushed the first Georgian social democratic republic in 1921, and killed and deported many of his fellow Georgians, but still, Stalin brings glory to Georgia.
According to Kaiser, under the ethnic patronage of Stalin, Georgian communists pursued nation-building and expanded their national rights. Georgians enjoyed disproportionately high communist party memberships and relatively higher education levels among national groups. Contrary to Ukraine and the Baltic states where local language and culture were subjected to the threat of Russification, the GSSR continued to be ruled by an ethnic Georgian leadership, which actively promoted Georgian language and culture, consolidating Georgian as a unified national and linguistical unit. Paradoxically, as Kaiser argues, the Soviet suppression of the 1956 Georgian protest against de-Stalinization in Tbilisi serves as another catalyst for the Georgian nation-building process. The compromise struck by Moscow and Tbilisi in the aftermath of the protest ironically gave Georgians more cultural and political space for their expression and negotiation over entitled nationhood and national rights in the post-Stalin era (Kaiser 2023, p. 135).
Ironically, the continual rise of Georgian nationalism in the late 1980s intensifies the tension between Georgian nationalists and other minorities over territorial disputes in the form of multiethnic conflict. The Soviet nationality policy facilitates Georgian nationalism, but the Soviet ideas of nationality and Georgians being the entitled national group within their socialist republic also entail the conflict with national minorities, who also seek to preserve their ethno-cultural autonomy and self-rule within their designated autonomous oblasts and republics under the GSSR. This ignited another wave of ethno-nationalist conflicts in 1989 between Georgians and other ethnic minorities, when the Soviet Union, the polity that grants them the right, status, and designated territory, was on the brink of breaking up. Today every Georgian nationalist you come across on the street will tell you that Abkhazians and South Ossetians are merely Russian assets instigated by Moscow to occupy Georgia's territories, thus crushing Georgia's hope to join NATO. Certainly, they have a point. NATO in the Bucharest summit in 2008 did not provide Georgia with a Membership Action Plan but an empty promise. Russia saw it as a sign of weakness of the West and executed its war plan in the same year after preparing for a decade in South Ossetia and Abkhazia, while Georgia under Saakashvili is still beefing up its military force, playing with the thought of regaining their historical territories through force (Illarionov p. 50-51).
Georgian nationalists will also argue that Abkhazians are just Georgians who are illusional in thinking of themselves as distinct cultural and national groups, and Ossetians are merely immigrants who settle in various Georgian Kingdoms for just a few hundred years, yet eventually seize historical lands that belong to Georgians. They do not have a history long enough for their national claim on Georgian historical territories. Both reasons they rely on in refuting their status as a national group deserving of national self-determination can be historical facts, but the logic behind it sounds alarming. My point of contention is that this does not fit into the current understanding of national identities. Anderson's Imagined Community sees a nation as a man-made product of collective imagination but not as something stable, eternal, or necessarily civilizational. If the prerequisite of being a national group is to have a long continual history to exist as a collective that has its own polity, and those who share a similar history at any moment should belong to the same national group, then Ukraine, as Mr Putin argues, is neither a nation nor a nation-state. Ukrainians and Russians both trace their origin back to the same historical myth of the Kyivan Russ, and Ukrainians for a long time are subordinated to the Tsarist rule and being assimilated by the Russians. To justify Latvians and Estonians as national groups is even trickier under such logic, since they only established their first nation states in the 20th century, and most of the time they are subjected to the rule of other national groups. But still today Latvia and Estonia are considered nation-states despite their relatively short history of national awakening. The way how Georgians deny Abkhazians and Ossetians as national groups, ironically, follows a similar logical line and conception of nations as Mr Putin's denial of a Ukrainian nation and a Ukrainian nation-state. More ironically, these subsequent inter-ethnic violence, wars, and exodus may indicate that Stalin did have a point on Georgian nationalists for "behaving like outright dominant-nation chauvinists towards other nationalities" in the Caucasus (Brandenberger & Zelenov 2014, p. 867). Just as Russia and Georgia form an imperial centre-periphery power relation, the relation between Georgians and other ethnic minorities also constitutes a similar kind of power dynamics. Such an interpretation, apparently, does not fit into the narratives of victimhood for all the national groups involved, and thus an unpopular remark that will infuriate any Georgian nationalists, who still wish to reclaim their lost territories. All these nuances and complexities are lost when one simply sees Abkhazians and Ossetians are merely Russian geopolitical assets for halting NATO enlargement.
Regardless of local perception of Stalin and their traumatic war experience in 2008, the sheer name of Uncle Joe continues to draw hundreds of tourists across the globe to visit Gori, a small town with strategic importance historically. These folks are willing to drop 15 Laris (40+ HKD) just to reminisce their own historical national memories of WWII --- a war that these visitors have never gone through in their lifetime. The museum is a Stalinist neo-classical building with a garden displaying Stalin's statue, his personal train car and the cottage where Ioseb Besaionis dze Jughashvili was born. The museum has no remarkable collections other than some used furniture, portraits and multiple quotes in Georgian and Russian praising Comrade Stalin for always making the right decisions. But this does not stop Indian uncle from hugging Comrade Stalin's statue for a selfie, and Taiwanese tourists reciting what they have learned from school --- on the Chinese national struggle against the Imperial Japanese force --- to their children when they saw pennants presented to Uncle Joe by no other than the PLA. Behind the museum, a few local hawkers are hopelessly waiting for tourists to walk by and pick up some communist-style souvenirs, including colourful Stalin socks, which you can find on Ali-express at way cheaper prices. Wood buildings are under renovation to preserve the cityscape in the old town in the hope of promoting local tourism. A historical town like Gori should have landmarks and stories other than Stalin to offer, yet it is only because of Stalin that tourists choose to briefly stop at Gori for 1-2 hours before they move on to other destinations. Many nonlocals would not realize traces and marks on buildings as a result of Russian shelling --- the Russian force occupied Gori briefly for 9 days before they retreated on 22 August 2008.
Commentators and outsiders often marvel at the fact that Russian speakers are living in a parallel universe within and outside Russian soil. This is especially true in Georgia and the Baltic States with a sizeable Russian-speaking population, be it residents, tourists, or citizens. Under Western sanctions and travel restrictions, Vnukovo airport is apparently emptier than it should be during the small hours. Still, my flight to Tbilisi is packed with Russian citizens looking forward to their holiday in Tbilisi or the seaside in Batumi. Georgians remember the humiliating defeat and the ongoing occupation of their territories by the Russian-backed regional separatists since 2008 and are eager to join the EU and NATO to preserve their sovereignty. But for ordinary Russians, Georgia remains a tourism hotspot even dating back to the Tsarist era for its natural landscape, wine, and water --- various luxurious Sanatoriums and spa hotels were once built near water sources that are said to have rich mineral content for curing diseases, serving mainly privileged party members and professionals during the Soviet times. For Georgian nationalists, it is not enough for Russian dissentient to be anti-Putin, they must also be anti-imperial, which means, acknowledging Russia's --- in Stalin's term --- "Great Power chauvinism" towards other small nations. For many Russians and even Sovietphiles of the older generation, it is an accusation that they are hard to swallow. How can the Soviet Union be an imperialist political project, when the Soviet nationality policy, as they perceive, has brought social and cultural unity in the Soviet space while promoting ethnographic diversity and the development of other national groups?
Some even further argue that Russia has no racism, as racism is only the product of the Western Europeans and the Americans. I beg to differ as a Chinese-looking dude who cannot speak fluent Russian. If racism is an emotionally charged word that no one can agree upon its exact meaning, then let's use another term --- racial hierarchy and unequal treatment, in cases where ethnicity normally should not be served as one of the criteria for treating people differently in the public sphere. In this sense, I will argue that Moscovites are more likely to explicitly judge and act according to existing racial hierarchy than those in St. Petersburg. A notable experience is at the immigration control point. Customs officers at the Vnukovo airport treated non-white people differently from whites, in particular, spending extra time more time to scrutinizing my passport for no obvious reasons. A Central Asian-looking dude ahead of me has spent around 15 minutes at the counter before proving he is the same person as in the passport photo. A Georgian man in front of me is stuck at the counter for 30 minutes for no obvious reason. I was questioned on my Visa-free entry regime for 20 minutes straight after repeated back-and-forth questioning and answering. My Russian friend told me Russian customs officers tend to give a hard time to everyone, but what I have seen told me otherwise. One can argue that there must be a reason behind justifying racial profiling towards Asian-looking people, and one should not mix it up with racial prejudice, as it has a higher threshold to prove. But how to explain why security guards at the metro station always spot me to inspect my bag instead of other white people if it is simply a random stop and check? Obviously, there are security guards in some metro stations who are going to scan as many passengers' belongings as possible, but the fact that I am the one who is always being randomly stopped and checked tells me that it cannot be a coincidence or simply my paranoia.
The term "Asian" entails a wide variety of races and ethnicities who can look quite different from one another, but it is safe to say that tourists and migrant workers from the former Central Asian Soviet Republic are a constant presence in big Russian cities like Moscow and St Petersburg, contributing money to tourism or sending remittance home. You will not question the joy and wonder these tourists from countries like Mongolia and Kyrgyzstan, alongside Indians and Chinese, when they finally stood on the red square for the first time under the fierce sun, reminiscing they were once brothers and sisters under the banner of Socialism. By doing so, their meagre spending keeps the service sector in these major cities alive in the absence of Western tourists. As for Mosovites and residents of St. Petersburg, tourists from the third world marvelling at the historical and developmental achievement of Russia is nothing new. There was a time when it was taken for granted. The world view of Russia as one of the two geopolitical centres surrounded by other developing nation-states and national groups within its reach is still embodied by the VDNH. Various national Pavilions are erected behind the Russian exhibition hall, a Stalinist neo-classical building which you will first come across after seeing the statue of Lenin. It continues to attract thousands of Russian speakers and foreign tourists by portraying the promise of development and progress under the guidance of the Vanguard from Moscow, a world order that has never fully been realized even during the Soviet times.
Russia is described as the land of opportunities on the map of the VDNH, which is still true for tens of thousands of people from the Caucasus and Central Asia looking for jobs and sending remittances home. But not all Russians welcome migrants from the periphery to compete for job opportunities, even for jobs that not many locals are willing to do. Just as the centre-periphery relations remain in place between Russia and its surrounding countries in terms of geopolitics and economy, racial hierarchy and prejudice have also passed on from the Soviet time in many white Slavic Russian's minds. Central Asians certainly provide a reliable source of cheap labour and enrich local diets with their national cuisines. You cannot imagine how important shawarma and Samsa are in providing the working poor with a cheap, nutritious, and quick meal, and many of these small businesses are owned and operated by Central Asians. Affordable fruits and fresh vegetables are imported to major cities in Russia from these peripheral countries according to seasons. Yet Asian-looking people and Muslims --- those who do not look alike with the Slavic white people --- are being judged or looked down upon by the more well-off city dwellers, especially in Moscow.
When I raised the issue of racial prejudice to some white Slavic men with whom I accidentally had a conversation inside the gym, what they could see was that if such things ever happen, it is only those frustrated one who tries to shift the blame to some easy target. And those who openly express racial prejudice are few among Russians, as not all Russians are white Slavic people. Some simply told me that since Moscovites earn more and enjoy a better standard of living than the rest of Russia, as well as countries nearby, the issue of income and wealth inequality may explain why they think they are the privileged ones. Assuming what they said is true, this does not change the fact that personal appearance and skin colour also serve as a proxy for judging one's education level and social status in Russia today, however unreliable it is in many cases. Furthermore, having a racial prejudice in one's mind is one thing, to express it through actions and abuses towards those you hate is another thing. No security check and metal detector can prevent ethnic violence in the metro station. On 1st June, a white Slavic woman with a knife attempted to attack a woman wearing a hijab inside the train compartment. The Nazi Video Monitoring Project has also recorded, in May 2024 alone, 82 videos with 112 incidents of assault based on racist motives circulated Russian telegram channels. Most victims were said to be identified as Central Asians or natives from various Caucasus republics by the attackers. These assaults may only represent a small group of extreme far rights within a diverse multi-ethnic state. Yet I suspect such racial prejudice or even hatred is more widespread than one could normally imagine in Moscow. And I hope this is just my biased view for arguing that racial hierarchy and prejudice do exist in major cities. It is more rampant in Moscow than others would imagine and it is not something new under the long-lasting center-peripheral relations between Russia and the subordinated national groups surrounding it.
References
Brandenberger, D., & Zelenov, M. V. (2014). Stalin’s Answer to the National Question: A Case Study on the Editing of the 1938 Short Course. Slavic Review, 73(4), 859–880. doi:10.5612/slavicreview.73.4.859
Cornell, S. E., & Starr, S. F. (2009). The Guns of August 2008: Russia’s war in Georgia. http://ci.nii.ac.jp/ncid/BB03687750
Kaiser, C. P. (2023). Georgian and Soviet. In Cornell University Press eBooks. https://doi.org/10.1515/9781501766817
NVMP RU (2024, June 5). Neo-Nazi attack video statistics for May 2024. NVMP’s Substack. https://nvmp.substack.com/p/neo-nazi-attack-video-statistics